Agency From a Radical Embodied Standpoint: An Ecological-Enactive Proposal by Segundo-Ortin, Miguel
fpsyg-11-01319 June 24, 2020 Time: 19:18 # 1
HYPOTHESIS AND THEORY
published: 26 June 2020
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01319
Edited by:
Anthony Chemero,
University of Cincinnati, United States
Reviewed by:
Melina Gastelum Vargas,
National Autonomous University
of Mexico, Mexico
Matthew Crippen,
Humboldt University of Berlin,
Germany
*Correspondence:
Miguel Segundo-Ortin
miguel.segundo.ortin@gmail.com
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Theoretical and Philosophical
Psychology,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 05 February 2020
Accepted: 19 May 2020
Published: 26 June 2020
Citation:
Segundo-Ortin M (2020) Agency
From a Radical Embodied Standpoint:
An Ecological-Enactive Proposal.
Front. Psychol. 11:1319.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01319
Agency From a Radical Embodied
Standpoint: An Ecological-Enactive
Proposal
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School of Liberal Arts, University of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW, Australia
Explaining agency is a significant challenge for those who are interested in the sciences
of the mind, and non-representationalists are no exception to this. Even though
both ecological psychologists and enactivists agree that agency is to be explained
by focusing on the relation between the organism and the environment, they have
approached it by focusing on different aspects of the organism-environment relation.
In this paper, I offer a suggestion for a radical embodied account of agency that
combines ecological psychology with recent trends in enactive cognitive science.
According to this proposal, while enactivism focuses primarily on describing how our
acquired sensorimotor schemes and habits mutually equilibrate, affecting our tendency
to act upon some affordances instead of others, ecological psychology focuses on
studying how perceptual information contributes to the actualization of the sensorimotor
schemes and habits without mediating representations, inferences, and computations.
The paper concludes by briefly exploring how this ecological-enactive theory of agency
can account for how socio-cultural norms shape human agency.
Keywords: agency, ecological psychology, enactivism, affordances, habits, sensorimotor schemes, information
INTRODUCTION
Enactivism and ecological psychology are the two main schools of thought in the radical embodied
cognitive sciences. They have much in common. Both approaches reject that cognition is confined
to the head, and prompt for explanatory strategies that break away with the idea that cognition is
based on the manipulation of mental representations. Likewise, both approaches stress the active
role of the body and the environment in the processes that bring about cognitive activities.
In light of these affinities, a number of authors have already suggested the possibility of a unified
approach to cognition that combines both theoretical frameworks (Chemero, 2009; McGann, 2014;
Baggs and Chemero, 2018; Kiverstein and Rietveld, 2018; Heras-Escribano, 2019). Inspired by these
proposals, this paper aims to contribute to this unification by focusing on the issue of agency. In
a minimal sense, we can understand agency as the capacity of individual organisms or systems
to execute goal-directed or intentional actions. So conceived, agency is manifested whenever an
individual “acts on its own behalf in an environment” (Kauffman, 2000, p. 8), or when she does
“something by itself according to certain goals” (Barandiaran et al., 2009, p. 369). In what follows, I
will focus on this basic form of agency, and I will not discuss other forms, such as collective agency.
The dominant account of agency in philosophy – also referred to as “the standard theory” of
agency (Schlosser, 2019) – assumes that a particular event x is an action just in case it has been
appropriately (non-accidentally) caused by a series of mental states which represent both my goal
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and the actions intended to pursue that goal1. There are
nonetheless reasons to think that the standard theory does not
provide a satisfactory account of agency. For one thing, it has
been pointed out that the standard theory is “too demanding,” for
there might be organisms “that are capable of genuine agency and
that do not possess representational mental states” (Schlosser,
2019). Besides, the fact that we currently lack a convincing story
of how mental states can be causally relevant to behavior in virtue
of their representational content undermines the credibility of
the standard theory. These and other related problems have
motivated defenders of 4E (embodied, embedded, extended, and
enactive) theories of cognition to articulate alternatives to this
standard account, emphasizing embodied and situated aspects of
action (see, e.g., Juarrero, 1999; Malafouris, 2013).
Interestingly, even though both ecological psychologists and
enactivists agree that agency must be explained by focusing on
the relation between the organism and the environment instead
of the individual’s representational states, they have evolved
their own individual (and largely independent) approaches to
it, focusing on different aspects of the organism-environment
relation. Taking stock of this, the purpose of this paper is twofold.
Firstly, I highlight the limitations of both the ecological and
enactive approaches to agency, showing why they can’t offer
a satisfactory account of it. Secondly, I show how ecological
psychology and enactivism can complement each other to
explain agency, overcoming their theoretical limitations. The
complementarity approach I envisage can be summarized as
follows: While enactivism focuses on investigating how the
history of interactions of an organism gives rises to a series
of sensorimotor schemes and habits that in turn play a causal
role in determining how she interacts with the affordances of
the environment, ecological psychology, through the notion
of ecological information, explains how the individual can
access to the environment’s affordances without mediating
representations and inferences. It is argued that the existence of
ecological perceptual information is essential to understand the
organism-environment coupling that, according to enactivists,
gives rise to action.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section “The Issue of
Agency in Ecological Psychology,” I analyze the most significant
theories of agency proposed by ecological psychologists – Reed’s
(1993, 1996) theory of intentions and Withagen et al.’s (2012,
2017) theory of affordances as invitations – and offer reasons
as to why these proposals are unsatisfactory. Then, following
the suggestion of Baggs and Chemero (2018) that ecological
psychologists should adopt the theory of agency of enactivism,
section “Enactive Agency” focuses on analyzing the enactive
accounts of biological and sensorimotor agency. However, I
argue that enactivism does not offer a satisfactory theory of
agency either, for it leaves undetermined how the organism
can access to the environmental structures that are relevant
to agential behavior – an aspect that, we shall see, is essential
to enactivism. Consequently, in section “Steps Toward the
Unification”; I propose a dual approach to agency that combines
1Exactly what counts as “appropriate causation” is a matter of discussion. However,
this qualification aims to rule out cases of deviant causation (see Wu, 2016).
the tools provided by enactivists and ecological psychologists.
Nonetheless, it is well-known that the relation between ecological
psychology and enactivism has not been an easy one. This
could lead us to think that such a unified theory of agency is
untenable. Section “Bridging the Uncanny Valley” confronts this
view by addressing the most significant disagreements between
enactivists and ecological psychologists. These disagreements
pertain to, for instance, the notion of information at use in
ecological psychology, or the nature of “sense-making” coined
by enactivists. As I shall argue, most of the tensions between
enactivists and ecological psychologists are based on reciprocal
misinterpretations. To finish up, section “Conclusions and
Directions for Future Research” concludes by briefly exploring
the potential of this ecological-enactive approach to agency to
explaining how human agency can be shaped by socio-cultural
norms and conventions.
THE ISSUE OF AGENCY IN
ECOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY
The ecological theory of perception was first introduced by
psychologist James J. Gibson in two seminal books published in
Gibson (1966) and Gibson (1979/2015), respectively. The main
ideas of this approach are: (i) that perception is direct; (ii) that
perception is active; and (iii) that perception is action-oriented.
First of all, ecological psychologists are famous for arguing
that perception is direct. To say that perception is direct is
equal to saying that it is not mediated by representations.
Instead, perception is conceived of as information detection.
Perceptual information is given by higher-order properties
of spatial-temporally extended patterns of stimulation – the
so-called “invariants”2. According to ecological psychologists,
since the invariants specify (lawfully correspond to) the
properties of the environment that give rise to them, they
provide non-ambiguous information about these environmental
properties. Therefore, detecting these invariants is enough
to be aware of the environment without the need for
representations and inferences.
The second principle states that perception is active.
Ecological psychologists reject the standard view of perception
as a passive, sub-personal process that takes place inside the
organism. Instead, perception is conceived of as “an achievement
of the individual” (Gibson, 1979/2015, p. 228). The reason for this
is twofold. On the one hand, the detection of information requires
that the agent actively modulates its attention to detect the
invariants that are relevant to their goal. In this sense, perception
is not something that happens in the animal, but something the
animal does. On the other hand, it is often the case that the
information needed to carry on a particular perceptual task is not
available in the array, but needs to be produced by the organism
itself. To see this, think of motion parallax – the continuous and
2In the ecological literature, it is common to distinguish between structural
and transformational invariants (see, e.g., Michaels and Carello, 1981). In short,
whereas structural invariants refer to the properties of the sensory stimulation that
remain unchanged, underlying other variations, transformational invariants are
the “modes of change” of perceptual objects.
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regular transformations of the apparent position of the objects
from the starting point to the endpoint of the movement. Because
the objects that are closer to the organism appear to move faster
than those that are located further away, detecting the different
speeds at which the objects “move” allows the organism to be
aware of the different distances she holds regarding them. Moving
as to produce motion parallax is thus an efficient strategy for
perceiving depth.
Third perception is action-oriented. According to ecological
psychologists, not only does action serve perception (as in the
case of motion parallax), but perception is primarily for the
control of the action. This idea is best captured by the claim
that the main objects of perception are the affordances – this is,
the opportunities for interaction that an environment (including
other organisms) offers to an individual. Accordingly, when we
detect information relative to the properties of an object (its
rigidity, its size, etc.) we are primarily aware of its affordances –
the possibility of grabbing it, throwing it, and so on. Hence, it is
by directly detecting information that organisms can make their
way in the world.
Some Gibsonians, however, have argued that the main
explanatory target of ecological psychology is not perception, but
agency. This idea is captured by Reed when he claims that “the
goal of ecological psychology is to explain agency scientifically,
not to explain it away or simply offer a discourse about it” (Reed,
1996, p. 19; see also Gibson, 1994). Three reasons justify the
importance of agency for ecological psychologists (see Brancazio
and Segundo-Ortin, 2020). Firstly, since perception requires the
active and purposeful exploration of the environment by the
animal, perception is already infused with our goals. Secondly,
because affordances are opportunities for action, not causes of
behavior, perception of affordances is not enough to regulate
action. Rather, the organism must act upon these affordances
(Gibson, 1967/1982, p. 411). Thirdly, because a single object
offers multiple potential affordances to an animal, how she
behaves is unconstrained by the affordances of the object. The
animal must select what affordance to actualize at each moment
(Cutting, 1982). Following this reasoning, I agree with Wagman
(2019) that to adequately explain how perception contributes
to action, we need a theory of agency, which is a theory
of how individuals “select, perceive, and actualize affordances
appropriately based on intention” (p. 148).
In what follows, I shall examine the two most significant
attempts to explain agency from the ecological side: Reed’s (1993,
1996) theory of intentions, and Withagen et al.’s (2012, 2017)
theory of affordances as invitations.
Reed’s Theory of Intentions
At the beginning of his Encountering the world, Reed (1996)
complains that “psychologists have persisted in modeling
animal and human behavior on mechanical principles, thus
neglecting perhaps the most fundamental problem of their field –
autonomous agency” (p. 10). Reed (1996) characterizes agency
as the capacity to put attention and action at the service of
one’s current intentions (see also Gibson and Rader, 1979). As
he explicates, “in any situation, an individual’s intentions serve
to select a small number of the potential affordances available
in that situation. This selection is reflected in the organization
of the individual’s attention and activity” (Reed, 1993, p. 46).
He nonetheless rejects the mainstream view of intentions as
mental states that cause actions, and proposes the following
characterization instead:
From an ecological point of view, intentions are not causes of
action, but patterns of organization of action; they are not mental
as opposed to physical, but are instead embodied in the kinds of
performances most likely found in cognitively capable creatures.
. . . The development of intention is thus the development of the
ability to nest bouts of exploratory and performatory behavior so
as to achieve desired outcomes (Reed, 1993, p. 62).
But, how do intentions emerge, if not in the mind of the
perceiver? According to Reed, an intention can only emerge
whenever there are multiple affordances available for the
organism to choose. To explain how an organism selectively acts
upon some affordances instead of others, Reed takes inspiration
from Darwinian evolutionary biology. He hypothesizes that
intentions, just like any other biological entity, emerge out of
processes of variation and selection. For him, the minimal units
of analysis for a theory of intentions are perception-action cycles
(PACs). Each PAC is specific to a particular affordance or, to
be more precise, to the information which specifies a particular
affordance. Then, Reed suggests that in situations where the
organism is offered multiple affordances, the PACs enter a sort
of competition, and this competition results in goal-oriented or
intentional behavior – namely, the actualization of an affordance.
As he himself writes, drawing a clear parallelism with Darwin’s
theory: “Intentions are thus the “species” that emerge out of
competition among perceptual and action processes for utilizing
affordances” (p. 65).
Reed’s account nonetheless suffers from significant
shortcomings. To begin with, Reed provides no clue about
the conditions under which the PACs compete. All we know is
that intentions to actualize particular affordances emerge out
of the competitions between PACs, but it is not clear what the
selection pressures that define this competition are.
Reed (1996) is famous for sketching a selectionist approach
in which affordances, conceived as environmental resources,
exert selection pressures and give rise to species equipped with
action systems –systems that are specialized in taking advantage
of particular affordances. The same proposal can be rehearsed
here to explain the emergence of intentions. Indeed, Reed (1996,
p. 18) tells us that “the relative availability (or non-availability)
of affordances create selection pressures on the behavior of
individual organism.”
Reed’s selectionist approach is under attack by current neo-
Gibsonians (see, e.g., Withagen and van Wermeskerken, 2010).
The reason for this is that his account is markedly adaptationist,
thus conflicting with the current trends in evolutionary biology.
In this adaptationist view, environmental pressure and natural
selection shape organisms’ evolution by favoring some genetic
mutations over others, while organisms remain as passive
receptacles of genes. This asymmetric approach to evolution
is deemed too simplistic by current evolutionary biologists,
who emphasize the active role of the organisms in altering the
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 June 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 1319
fpsyg-11-01319 June 24, 2020 Time: 19:18 # 4
Segundo-Ortin Agency From a Radial Embodied Standpoint
selection pressures to which they are exposed (see Lewontin,
1983; Laland et al., 2016)3. In addition, Turvey has recently
argued that adaptationism is incompatible with ecological
psychology, for it perpetuates the dualism of organism and
environment (Turvey, 2018, p. 16).
Moreover, we can think of actions that are either irrelevant for
our survival (e.g., nail-biting) or harmful (e.g., smoking), but that
nonetheless belong to our common behavioral repertoire. This
is a problem for Reed’s account, since if the PACs that give rise
to these intentional actions are either irrelevant or detrimental
(mal-adaptive) for the organism, then it is hard to see how we
can make sense of some people’s tendencies to bite their nails or
smoke from the adaptationist approach4.
Another possibility, also sketched by Reed (1993, 1996),
is that social interaction contributes to the development of
particular intentions. In this view, the competition between PACs
is influenced by the actions of others who instruct and correct
the behavior of the individuals, teaching them “what affordances
can be utilized by whom and when” (Reed, 1993, p. 52, emphasis
original). Although appealing, this second possibility is quite
limited, for it only applies, as Reed himself acknowledges, to
animals with complex societies and sociocultural norms. Surely,
human agency is constrained by the social norms that rule within
the communities we inhabit, but a theory of agency based solely
on social norms cannot pay the entire bill, for there are non-
human animals that are capable of agency and do not have social
norms. These shortcomings have led other neo-Gibsonians to
formulate alternative accounts of agency.
Affordances as Invitations
Whereas Reed (1993, 1996) attempted to explain agency
by drawing from Darwinian evolutionary biology, Withagen
et al. (2012, 2017) try to do so by relying on contemporary
phenomenology (Dreyfus and Kelly, 2007). Withagen et al. begin
by rejecting the notion of intention put forth by Reed. Then, they
argue that if we want to understand agency in ecological terms,
we must think of affordances not just as opportunities for action,
but as invitations to act as well:
If we recognize that affordances can also invite behavior,
we are forced to a conception of agency that puts the
animal-environment relation much more central. When actively
exploring the environment, the agent is attracted or repelled by
some of its affordances, and the ensuing behavior is partly the
result of these invitations. This means that to understand how
animals make their way in the world, the inviting character of
affordances should be taken central (Withagen et al., 2012, p. 257).
According to this view, the environment does not simply offer
a neutral manifold of possibilities for acting. Rather, some of
its affordances can also invite us to act a certain way, “with us
bodily responding to these callings” (Withagen et al., 2017, p. 12).
3Even though this idea has been popularized by Lewontin, it is already present in
the work of American Pragmatist John Dewey (see Crippen, 2016, p. 235).
4Some evolutionary biologists have nonetheless suggested that there might be
factors, other than bestowing adaptive advantages to a species, that cause a
genotype to be favored by natural selection (see Dawkins, 1976). I thank a reviewer
for the pointer.
Importantly, this is not to equate affordances with invitations.
Instead, the hypothesis is that, under certain conditions, some
affordances can invite action, whereby the invitational character
of the affordances “depends on the agent-environment relation”
(Withagen et al., 2012, p. 256)5.
If phenomenology is called upon to provide the theoretical
inspiration for this proposal, Withagen et al. (2012, 2017) look
at industrial design and architecture to provide real examples
of affordances as invitations. For example, Norman (1988/2013)
demonstrated years ago that the design of an object affects the
individuals’ usage of it, making some affordances more easily
perceivable and, consequently, more likely to be seized6.
Withagen et al. (2012) mention other organismal factors that
can contribute to making affordances invitations. These factors
include the action capabilities of the agent, the evolution of the
species, the cultural background of the individual, and, finally,
the history of interactions of the individual. As they explicate,
“this inviting character of the affordances depends on the agent-
environment relation, arguably in a multidimensional way . . .
This suggests that whether an affordance invites is an animal-
relative property of the environment as well” (p. 256).
Nonetheless, even if we can find the characterization of
affordances as invitations suggestive and theoretically valuable7,
the issue remains as to see how this characterization helps us to
advance in our understanding of agency. Two main issues remain
to be solved. First, invitations to act are not causes of behavior
either. In fact, Withagen et al. go on to characterize agency
as “the animal’s capacity to modulate the coupling strength
with these affordances – the agent can influence to what extent
each invitation influences him or her” (Withagen et al., 2017,
p. 14). Therefore, thinking of affordances as invitations does
not fully resolve the problem of how to explain agency, for we
still have to make sense of the capability of the individuals to
5Gibson is ambiguous regarding the notion of “invitation”: “The concept of
affordance is derived from these concepts of valence, invitation and demand but
with a crucial difference. The affordance of something does not change as the need
of the observer changes. The perception of its affordances should not be confused
with the temporary special attraction it may have” (Gibson, 1979/2015, p. 130,
emphasis original).
6For instance, Norman suggests that by changing the design of a door, namely, by
adding an easily reachable flat bar instead of a knob, we can “indicate” the user
that she needs to push the door to open it (Norman, 1988/2013, p. 10). A first-
pass objection to this idea is that it is not clear how industrial design proves that
affordances may also be invitations. In short, making some affordances more easily
perceivable is not the same as making these affordances invitations.
7Other authors have further expanded the connection between the notion of
affordances-as-invitations and agency. For instance, Rietveld and Kiverstein (2014)
include invitations as a crucial element of their Skilled Intentionality Framework,
and assert that “[i]n acquiring a skill the individual becomes increasingly expert
at responding adequately and appropriately to the actions a particular situation
invites” (p. 334). In a similar vein, Crippen (2019) incorporates invitations
to discussions in aesthetics, emotional perception, and action, suggesting that
“[m]ysterious smiles and settings likewise can be understood in terms of
affordances because both suggest something worthwhile is hidden, thereby inviting
approach, exploration and deeper penetration” (p. 11). Some others strongly
disagree with this view, however. For instance, Heras-Escribano argues that “the
alleged invitational character of affordances adds nothing to our understanding
of the epistemic and ontological aspects of affordances per se. On the contrary,
this inviting character might make affordances even more obscure to understand”
(Heras-Escribano, 2018, p. 111).
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modulate their relation to the inviting affordances8. Second, and
more importantly, this account presupposes agency instead of
explaining it. To see this, consider the following passage:
An affordance can invite behavior if and only if an agent perceives
it. If affordances are not perceived (or even have not been
discovered) they do not have the potential to attract (or repel)
the according behavior of the agent. Hence, a prerequisite for
affordances to invite is an actually present observer that actively
explores the affordances of its environment (Withagen et al.,
2012, p. 257).
Whereas the affordances of the environment exist
independently of being perceived by the individual, for an
affordance to invite it, needs to be perceived. This means that for
affordances to invite, we need an organism that is already capable
of exploring its environment, actively focusing its attention
in some informational patterns instead of others. This is, for
affordances to invite, we already need an agent.
In conclusion, even though a theory of agency can incorporate
invitations (namely, to make sense of actions that we perform in
an unconscious or pre-reflective way), conceiving of affordances
as invitations leaves untouched core aspects of the notion
of agency. Motivated by this, some defenders of ecological
psychology have come to propose that Gibsonians should look
for a theory of agency in the other main school of thought in the
radical embodied cognitive sciences: enactivism. To quote Baggs
and Chemero (2018):
Ecological psychology focuses on the nature of the environment
that animals perceive and act in; enactivism focuses on the
organism as an agent. Combining the two would seem to provide
a complete picture of cognition: an enactive story of agency,
and an ecological story of the environment to which the agent
is coupled (p. 2).
Unfortunately, Baggs and Chemero do not elaborate on
this proposal, and do not explain how the enactive theory of
agency can fit into the ecological picture. In section “Enactive
Agency,” I shall analyze what enactivists have said about
agency9. Can enactivism provide an account for how different
individuals selectively perceive and act upon the affordances of
the environment?
ENACTIVE AGENCY
One of the most important ideas presented in The Embodied
Mind (Varela et al., 1991/2016) is that cognition arises out from
the active and reciprocal coupling between the agent and its
environment. The enactive framework emphasizes the role of the
agent in enacting, or bringing about, their own cognitive life,
but rejects that it needs to be done through representations and
8Bruineberg and Rietveld (2014) have proposed to explain this modulation by
appealing to the Free Energy Principle in neurodynamics.
9In what follows, I will focus exclusively on the enactive approach first developed
by Varela et al. (1991/2016), and extended in the works of Thompson (2007) and
Di Paolo et al. (2017, 2018), as it is the branch that most prominently has focused
on the issue of agency.
internal computational operations. Like Gibsonians, enactivists
put agency at the center of their research program.
In an attempt to clarify what the notion of agency amounts
to, Barandiaran et al. (2009) provide the following working
definition. According to them, a system qualifies as an agent if
it meets three necessary and jointly sufficient conditions. First,
individuality: For a system to be an agent, there must be a
distinction between the system and its environment. This is not
to say that the system must be completely detached from the
external world, but that it must be able to maintain itself as
something distinguishable from the latter. Second, interactional
asymmetry: Even if the environment can cause the individual
to act a certain way on particular occasions, for an individual
system to be an agent, it must be able to modulate the coupling
with the environment, initiating some processes and resisting
the tendencies exerted by the medium when needed. Finally,
normativity: According to this condition, an agent must have
intrinsic goals, and these goals provide a normative reference
against which an action can be considered a success or a fail.
This last condition is crucial, for it allows us to distinguish
actions, properly speaking, from other bodily phenomena such
as trembles or spasms.
According to Di Paolo et al. (2017, 2018), these three
conditions provide the basic characterization for a notion of
agency, and they can be used to investigate the different forms in
which agency can be manifested: biological, sensorimotor, social,
and linguistic. In what follows, I will focus on the biological and
sensorimotor forms of agency, as I take them to be the most
directly relevant to ecological psychology.
Biological Agency
Arguably, the official story of enactivism begins with the notion of
“autonomy.” This concept was first introduced by Varela (1979;
see also Barandiaran, 2017) to capture the peculiar dynamics
of living systems. In Varela’s view, living systems owe their
existence to what he dubs “organizational closure.” A system
is organizationally closed when it is composed of a number
of internal dynamical processes such that (i) they recursively
depend on each other (each process is simultaneously a causal
enabling condition for, and an effect of other processes), and
(ii) they constitute the system as a unity that is recognizable
and identifiable against its medium. Autonomy is regarded by
enactivists as a necessary and sufficient condition to speak of an
individual system.
The most basic form of autonomy can be seen in autopoiesis.
Autopoiesis, also referred to as “material self-production,” refers
to the capacity of living systems to generate and maintain
their own identity as something distinct from the environment.
According to Weber and Varela (2002), an autopoietic system
consists of:
A network of processes of production (synthesis and destruction)
of components such that these components:
1. Continuously regenerate and realize the network that
produces them, and
2. Constitute the system as a distinguishable unity in the
domain in which they exist (p. 115).
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According to the theory of autopoiesis, living beings preserve
themselves in virtue of being organized as a network of metabolic
processes that generate their own components. So conceived,
autopoiesis differs from other dynamical processes because of its
reflexivity: “the autopoietic system is organized so as to produce
that very organization” (McGann, 2007, p. 469).
To say that autopoietic systems are autonomous is not
to say that they are self-sufficient. Crucially, it is because
all living beings need to interact with the world to preserve
their autonomy that they develop an individual perspective
of the environment. At the very least, a system must be
able to distinguish those aspects of the environment that are
valuable or meaningful to its autopoiesis. The appearance of
this individual perspective from which features of the world
are perceived in relation to the autonomous system’s viability
is what enactivists call “sense-making.” This capacity for sense-
making is, according to enactivists, what distinguishes cognitive
from non-cognitive systems, and it is key to understanding
biological agency.
Thompson (2007) illustrates this view through bacterial
chemotaxis. Because the bacterium exploits sucrose as a source
of nutrient, it is attracted to sugar concentration, whereas
other chemicals are neutral or repulsive. Crucially, although
sucrose is a real entity of the bacterium’s environment, its
status or meaning as food is not. Rather, the latter is linked
to the bacterium’s metabolic needs. This is the sense in which
enactivists claim that the meaningful or cognitive environment
is “brought forth” by the organism’s activity. As Thompson
(2007) explicates, for the sense-maker, “the environment becomes
a place of valence, of attraction and repulsion, approach or
escape” (p. 158). Thus, according to the enactive picture,
being a sense-maker implies being ready to selectively act
upon the affordances of the environment that are relevant to
maintain autonomy.
Nonetheless, Di Paolo (2005) argues that autopoiesis alone
provides a very thin understanding of sense-making and agency.
The reason for this is that autopoiesis provides an “all-or-
nothing norm” (Di Paolo, 2005, p. 436), according to which
environmental features are relevant only in relation to their
direct impact on the system’s autopoiesis. Two undesired
consequences follow from this. First, autopoiesis leaves no
space for the possibility that organisms act to actively avoid
or seek situations on the basis of physical encounters that
are not inherently lethal/non-lethal. Think, for instance, about
the footprint left by a prey. This environmental encounter
is relevant for the organism, if only as a reliable proxy for
future autopoietically relevant affordances (nutrition). However,
because the footprint does not physically affect the organism’s
metabolism, it is deemed meaningless for the point of view
of the theory. Second, autopoiesis does not conceive of
the possibility that organisms actively seek to improve the
conditions for self-production, e.g., by swimming up the sugar
gradient.
To overcome these limitations, Di Paolo proposes to combine
autopoiesis with adaptivity. A system is deemed adaptive when it
is able “to regulate itself with respect to the boundaries of its own
viability” (p. 430). To do so, the system must implement a set of
second-order processes10 that allow it to actively monitor internal
and external perturbations, putting environmental encounters
in relation to the whole spectrum of its viable states and
thus recognizing in these encounters the tendencies that can
lead to the loss or improvement of its autopoiesis. Adaptive
systems are thus a subclass of autopoietic systems that can
recognize environmental features as meaningful in virtue of
their virtual consequences, thus perceiving “graded differences
between otherwise equally viable states” (p. 437).
Autopoiesis and adaptivity are thus said to provide the
bedrocks for a theory of agency at the biological level (Di Paolo
et al., 2017, 2018; Heras-Escribano, 2019). Whereas autopoiesis
(and, more generally, autonomy) provides the basic norms, or
goals, for the system, e.g., to maintain its precarious individuality,
adaptivity provides the means by which otherwise irrelevant
environmental features are meaningfully identified, increasing
the system’s sensitivity to the affordances of the environment and
enabling it “to distinguish a situation as a risk or an opportunity,
to tell the difference between good and better, bad and worse”
(Di Paolo et al., 2018, p. 33). Therefore, an adaptive autopoietic
system will be able not only to perceive the footprint as an
opportunity to feed, but will also appreciate whether following
the track of the prey is the best option given the circumstances.
Investigating the species-specific mechanisms that give rise to this
“graded perception” is a crucial step to understand how different
organisms asymmetrically regulate their action in environments
with multiple competing affordances (Reed, 1993)11.
Yet, in a sense, biological agency is very limited. Since the
kind of norms that arise out from biological autonomy concern
to our self-individuation only, if we were just biological agents,
the only affordances of the world that we would care for would be
those that are related to our survival. Anything that is not directly
relevant to being alive would be non-significant to us. At the same
time, we would always avoid taking any action that could entail a
risk to our biological integrity (actions such as drinking alcohol,
smoking, and so on). As both conclusions are obviously false, we
can safely infer that, at least for human beings, biological agency
cannot be the whole story.
Sensorimotor Agency
Recently, Di Paolo et al. (2017) have attempted to complement
the previous account with a theory of what they call
“sensorimotor agency.” This kind of agency is present in
sophisticated organisms capable of learning and acquiring new
behavioral repertoires, and while it is enabled by biology, it is
underdetermined by it.
The hypothesis that justifies the extension of agency beyond
the biological realm is that we can find a form of autonomy
at the level of perception and action. Two notions are crucial
for this idea. The first one is “sensorimotor scheme.” These
are organized, mutually adjusted sequences of sensorimotor
10I deem these processes “second-order” because they are not constitutive of the
system’s autopoiesis.
11Whereas the general notion of adaptivity is made operational through concepts
from dynamical systems theory (“state trajectories,” “attractor landscape,” “viability
set,” etc.), Di Paolo (2005, p. 440) offers suggestions about what the mechanisms
that give rise to adaptivity in bacterial chemotaxis might look like.
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coordination patterns that the individual deploys in carrying out
a specific task and have been established as preferable in light
of some normative framework, be it internal or external to the
individual (namely, considerations of efficacy, timing, precision,
and so on)12. To understand what sensorimotor schemes are,
think, for example, of the activity of cooking a recipe. If the
recipe requires that we chop the zucchini to a specific thickness,
I will need to coordinate the movements of my hands in order
to keep the appropriate distance between the knife and my
fingers. However, this coordination is only possible on the basis
of the continuous perceptual experience, and then requires the
establishment of a task-oriented sensorimotor pattern. In normal
conditions, this sensorimotor pattern will not be enacted in
isolation. On the contrary, while I am chopping the zucchini,
I shall pay attention to the onion that I put on the pan, either
by looking directly at it or by smelling it, to prevent it from
getting burned. Hence, the task of cooking a meal requires the
enactment of multiple sensorimotor patterns. At the beginning,
these patterns are not well integrated (my hand coordination is
rather clumsy, I cannot identify when the onion in the pan is
burning, etc.), but as long as I get proficient in cooking this meal,
these patterns get intertwined in the form of a scheme: a task-
related, mutually supporting relation of coherent sensorimotor
patterns. Next time I cook this meal, I will have the disposition to
execute (“enact”) the same sensorimotor patterns I successfully
enacted in the past.
It is important to realize, however, that the execution of a
scheme is not innocuous. Rather, when a particular scheme is
executed, it has an effect on other schemes, either preventing
them from occurring or increasing the likeliness they will be
enacted. This leads us to the realization that sensorimotor
schemes, just like individual coordination patterns, can be
organized in “clusters,” or networks of mutually coherent
and enabling sensorimotor schemes. Drawing a parallelism
with autopoiesis, these networks of schemes are regarded as
the “individuals” that give rise to sensorimotor agency: “the
behavioral analog to biological agency is a network of precarious
but interactively self-sustaining sensorimotor schemes, i.e. a
self-asserting sensorimotor repertoire, whose adaptive regulation
is directed at the preservation of internal coherence and
consistency” (Buhrmann and Di Paolo, 2017, p. 219). According
to this picture, a network of schemes constitutes a particular
autonomous system that “is reasserted by every successful act and
challenged by every breakdown” (Di Paolo, 2019, p. 15).
Thus, whereas the study of biological agency requires that we
focus on understanding how metabolic and adaptive processes
give rise to a selective engagement with the biologically relevant
affordances of the environment, the study of sensorimotor agency
requires that we focus on understanding how sensorimotor
schemes intertwine with others, forming mutually consistent
networks. The network of sensorimotor schemes an organism
embodies determines how she deals with the world – her
sensorimotor “style” or “identity.” As such, when we face the
world, most of the time we are already “equipped with a
12The conditions under which different coordination patterns cohere are referred
to as “sensorimotor norms.”
rich repertoire of ready-made, highly organized [sensorimotor
schemes]” (Di Paolo et al., 2017, p. 81), some of them widespread
across the species, and others acquired in our previous history
of interactions. These schemes condition what affordances we
perceive and act upon, making some actions natural, while
others feel awkward or unfamiliar. Therefore when considered
at the sensorimotor level, the affordances of the environment
become relevant not only because they contribute to our survival,
but because they bestow “the stability and coherence of [our]
sensorimotor repertoire” (p. 39).
The other important notion is “habit,” where habits are
regarded as “self-sustaining precarious sensorimotor schemes”
(Di Paolo et al., 2017, p. 144). A sensorimotor scheme is deemed
precarious whenever the elements that support it depend for their
structural stability on the regular enactment of the scheme. It
means that “if the habitual scheme is not enacted with sufficient
frequency, the structures supporting it starts to lose the properties
that enable it. Eventually, the capability to enact the scheme
degrades and disappears” (p. 144).
Enactivists oppose to the traditional reading of habits as
rigid patterns of behavior that get automatically activated in
the presence of the right environmental cues. As explained by
Barandiaran and Di Paolo (2014), this conception spans from
Descartes and Locke to modern behaviorism, and regards habits
as units that result from the association of ideas or between
stimulus and response, thus opposing habits to intelligent
actions. By contrast, enactivists take the notion of habit from
Phenomenology and Pragmatism, and picture them as behavioral
routines that can be flexibly changed or customized if the context
requires it. Indeed, pretty much in line with Dewey (1922), Egbert
and Barandiaran (2014) go as far as to suggest that habits are
essential to cognition, thus breaking the dichotomy between
habitual and intelligent actions13.
But, what do habits have to do with sensorimotor agency?
The key lies in the idea that habits are “self-sustaining.” As Di
Paolo et al. (2017) explicate, this means that “a habit “calls” for its
exercise and its exercise in turn reinforces its durability” (p. 144).
According to this view, the fact that a particular sensorimotor
scheme is habitual entails that it is more prompted to be enacted.
As such, while different sensorimotor patterns can be as effective
as others to reach a particular goal, some of them “are preferred
because they are habitual and comfortable” (p. 143). Acquired
sensorimotor habits thus guide the way we relate to the external
world, normatively defining a set of viable actions (affordances)
that can contribute to their preservation:
According to the enactive approach, habits are self-sustaining
networks of bodily, neural, and interactional processes that
become a source of [non-metabolic] normativity for an agent,
in such a way that the preservation of her habitual identities
guides much of her perception, thoughts, and behaviors (Ramírez-
Vizcaya and Froese, 2019, p. 7).
13Habits are pivotal in the way Dewey understand human cognitive live. For
example, he argues that “[r]eason pure of all influence from prior habits is a fiction”
(Dewey, 1922, p. 31). Elaborating on this view, Crippen (2016, p. 247) suggests that
the Deweynian notion of habit could be the basis of an enactive theory of morality.
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Enactivists thus propose to investigate sensorimotor agency
by studying how sensorimotor schemes and habits develop and
relate to each other forming complex ecologies that in turn
affect the way we interact with the world. In fact, following
the enactive lead, Kiverstein and Rietveld (2018) understand
habits as “interrelated states of action-readiness that coordinate
to multiple relevant affordances” (p. 154). To complement this
approach, enactivists have proposed a theory that attempts
to explain how habits couple and mutually stabilize, as well
as the conditions that determine how sensorimotor schemes
become habits. Admittedly, the enactive theory of sensorimotor
learning (Di Paolo et al., 2017; Di Paolo, 2019) is still to be
further developed and tested upon, but it constitutes a significant
milestone in the radical embodied cognitive sciences.
STEPS TOWARD THE UNIFICATION
Now that we have a thorough picture of the enactive theory of
agency, it is time to come back to the suggestion made by Baggs
and Chemero (2018). Can enactivism alone provide ecological
psychologists with a theory of agency? My answer to this question
is no. The reason for this has to do with the way enactivists
characterize sensorimotor schemes.
According to the enactivist characterization, sensorimotor
schemes (and networks of these) are grounded in the complex
dynamical arrangement of certain properties within the agent
(namely, musculo-skeletal structures and neural networks) that
in turn give rise to specific sensitivities and dispositions to
act. Despite this characterization, Di Paolo et al. (2017) are
clear that sensorimotor schemes are not something a body
possesses. Rather, they claim that these are “modes in which
structures in the agent and structures in the environment meet
and mutually stabilize” and that they “constitutively involve
both the organismic body and its environment” (p. 152). But if
the environment is constitutive of the organism’s sensorimotor
schemes, it follows that agency is not a property that belongs to
the organism or a system, but “a property of a relation between
that system as its surroundings” (p. 110).
This means that in order to explain agency and account
for how sensorimotor schemes and habits unfold, selectively
exploiting some affordances of the environment instead of others,
we have to account for how the organism can access to the
environmental structures that complement and stabilize her
sensitivities and dispositions. Without this complementary story,
the enactive theory of sensorimotor agency remains incomplete:
Having powers and sensitivities required for action, in other
words, is only half of the story. The other half is access to
suitable accompanying conditions surrounding the agent, which
in our world-involving perspective must themselves be active and
concrete and not merely formal (Di Paolo, 2019, p. 212).
My claim is that ecological psychology can provide enactivists
with this complementary story and then that it can contribute
to explaining agency. According to this idea, what enables
the organism to access the environmental structures that are
relevant to its goals is the existence of perceptual information.
This information is given in the form of spatial-temporally
extended patterns of stimulation that lawfully correspond or
specify the environmental properties that are relevant for the
system’s sensorimotor repertoire. This point is rather important
because, according to the Gibsonian tradition, it is the existence
of ecological perceptual information what makes possible the
coupling between the individual and the affordances of the
environment, and then the coupling of perception and action,
without the necessity of performing inferences upon mental
representations14. Thanks to this lawful correspondence, the
organism can directly perceive the possibility of passing by an
aperture if she detects the structured energy distribution this
aperture generates. Remove the specific information, and you
will be back to the old problem of having to explain how
organisms can access the environment based on ambiguous and
impoverished stimuli.
I therefore propose a dual approach to agency that combines
the tools provided by enactivists and ecological psychologists.
While enactivists focus primarily on describing how our acquired
sensorimotor schemes and habits mutually equilibrate, affecting
our tendency to act upon some affordances instead of others,
ecological psychologists focus on studying how perceptual
information contributes to the actualization of sensorimotor
habits without mediating representations, inferences, and
computations. Thus, we can replace the rather unspecific claim
made by Di Paolo et al. (2017) for something more concrete:
agency is a property of the relation between the organism and
its environment, where this coupling is made possible by the
existence of ecological perceptual information the organism can
directly detect and exploit in guiding its action.
The contribution of ecological psychology to the enactive
theory of agency can be seen in the following two examples.
First, ecological psychology can bring to the enactive theory of
agency a series of well-tested theoretical and empirical methods
that allow us to identify what informational patterns need
to be detected to enact a particular scheme, carrying out its
associated task. For example, thanks to Lee (2009), we know
that the information required to control braking is “time-to-
contact,” and that this information is present in the optical
looming pattern produced by the approaching obstacle. The
crucial aspect here is that since the optical looming specifies
the time remaining until driver and object collide, it provides
unequivocal information to the driver about the actions she can
perform: namely, whether braking is still possible, or she should
prepare herself for an imminent collision. Experimental evidence
shows that the same information is exploited to intercept moving
targets (Fajen et al., 2008) and that it can be detected by dynamic
touch as well (Cancar et al., 2013). The literature on time-to-
contact shows that ecological psychology provides both a formal
(mathematical) characterization of the informational variables
required to successfully perform different tasks and a series of
concrete examples of the sensory patterns where these variables
are manifested, as Di Paolo (2019, p. 212) demands.
14As Withagen and Chemero write: “Direct perception is a coupling between
the perceiver and the environment, via information in the array” (Withagen and
Chemero, 2012, p. 532).
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Moreover, this unified approach allows us to advance
a new characterization of sensorimotor mastery. In this
picture, sensorimotor mastery depends on embodying habitual
sensorimotor schemes that integrate action patterns with the
appropriate task-specific ecological information. Coming back to
the example of cooking, sensorimotor mastery in this context
requires that I coordinate my actions with the information of the
environment, enacting action schemes that are well attuned to
the information that is relevant to the task I am performing –
namely, the olfactory information that specifies that the onion
is burning in the pan. The process of coming to detect this
task-relevant information is what Gibsonians call “education
of attention” (Jacobs and Michaels, 2007). However, since the
perceptual information needed to perform a task is not always
present in the immediate environment, sensorimotor mastery
also requires that we learn how to act in order to produce it. For
example, the lion can learn that an efficient strategy to perceive
whether the prey is reachable is to produce motion parallax,
and can incorporate this act within its broader hunting-related
sensorimotor schemes. Similar examples can be found in the
literature about “dynamic touch,” where perceivers actively and
skillfully manipulate objects in order to perceive their affordances
(see Turvey and Carello, 2011).
In conclusion, rather than simply taking the enactive theory
of sensorimotor agency from enactivism as Baggs and Chemero
(2018) propose, I hold that ecological psychologists, through
the notion of ecological perceptual information, can contribute
to explaining it.
BRIDGING THE UNCANNY VALLEY
In the previous section, I have proposed an approach to
sensorimotor agency that combines enactivism and ecological
psychology. However, it has been recurrently pointed out that
there exist essential tensions between both research programs.
Di Paolo et al. (2017) nicely captures this view when he claims
that “the relation between the schools of thought [enactivism
and ecological psychology] is one of strange familiarity, as if
their respective practitioners were staring at each other across an
uncanny valley” (p. 18, ff. 3). In what follows, I shall attempt to
bridge this valley. To do so, I will address the most significant
reasons that ground the tension between these schools of thought.
My purpose is to show that these tensions are based on reciprocal
misinterpretations.
To begin with, it is well-known that Varela et al. (1991/2016)
conceived of enactivism in opposition not only to classical
cognitivism, but also to ecological psychology. Whereas they
agree with Gibsonians that perceptually guided action need not be
explained by positing mental representations, they disagree with
the explanatory strategy put forth by ecological psychologists. As
they argue, the ecological picture gives no explanatory relevance
to the organism’s own activity, and instead tries to explain
perception entirely from the side of the environment:
For Gibson, these optical invariances, as well as the environmental
properties they specify, do not depend in any way upon the
perceptually guided activity of the animal (though Gibson’s
followers do relativize them to a given animal niche). . . . In a
nutshell, then, whereas Gibson claims that the environment is
independent, we claim that it is enacted . . . Thus the resulting
research strategies are also fundamentally different: Gibsonians
treat perception in largely optical (albeit ecological) terms and so
attempt to build up the theory of perception almost entirely from
the environment. Our approach, however, proceeds by specifying
the sensorimotor patterns that enable action to be perceptually
guided, and so we build up the theory of perception from the
structural coupling of the animal (p. 204).
Varela et al.’s diagnosis that ecological psychology neglects the
structural coupling of organism and environment can also be
found in the work of current enactivists. Consequently, they keep
presenting enactivism as opposed to ecological psychology:
We agree with ecological psychologists when they highlight that
real environments are rich enough to access directly their relevant
meaningful aspects. We think they are in fact too rich, and
that sense-making always involves a massive reduction of all the
environmental energies that might affect the agent, to those within
the dimensions of biological, sensorimotor, and social historically
contingent meaning (Di Paolo et al., 2017, p. 227).
I hold that this position is based on a misreading of ecological
psychology. For one thing, we must note that affordances –
the primary objects of perception for ecological psychology –
are organism-dependent. For example, that the glass I have in
front of me is graspable is not a property of the glass alone,
but a property that holds in virtue of the relation between
the glass and myself. It is because I am equipped with hands
of a certain size and opposable thumbs that the glass affords
graspability to me, but it will not afford the same action to my
cat. This is why J. J. Gibson always insisted that affordances
point two ways, to the environment and to the observer (Gibson,
1979/2015, p. 121, 132). Moreover, the affordances do not depend
on physical relations alone, but need to be related to the observer’s
capabilities as well (Chemero, 2009). For example, studies have
shown that the perception of the climbability of a step is
susceptible to change as the perceiver ages or gets physically tired
(Konczak et al., 1992).
Yet it is not only the affordances that imply the
complementarity of animal and environment but the information
too. At the beginning of The Ecological Approach to Visual
Perception, Gibson (1979/2015) introduces a crucial distinction
between the environment and the physical world. As he
explicates, while the physical world comprises everything “from
atom to galaxies” (p. 4), the environment refers only to those
aspects of the world that can be detected and interacted with
by a particular organism. Ecological information is said to be
in the environment, not the world per se, meaning that the
notion of information is relational as well (Segundo-Ortin et al.,
2019). For example, whereas electromagnetic fields constitute
information for sharks in the sense that sharks can detect and
exploit them, they do not have the same status for human beings.
Even though electromagnetic fields are real physical properties
of the world, their status as perceptual information is determined
at the ecological scale – the scale of the perceiver.
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On the other hand, although Gibsonians put the emphasis
on the environment when explaining perception-action, they
do not claim that the environment alone suffices to cause it.
By contrast, as we mentioned before, ecological psychologists
conceive of perception as a sort of activity – something the
animal does. It requires that the organism actively forages for
information, sometimes moving in order to give rise to and
perceive the required invariant patterns. This clearly shows that
ecological psychologists do not obviate the role of the individual
in bringing about or “enacting” its own perceptual world, as
enactivists claim15.
Therefore, we can conclude that it is wrong to assert that
ecological psychologists aim to explain perception only from the
side of the environment. In fact, several Gibsonians have held that
the correct unit of analysis for an ecological theory of perception
is the organism-environment system, emphasizing the structural
coupling, or “mutuality,” of both relata (see, e.g., Michaels and
Carello, 1981; Richardson et al., 2008; Turvey, 2018).
Di Paolo et al. (2017) advance a complementary reason to
feel unease about ecological psychology. According to them,
even though ecological psychology rejects representationalism, it
keeps committed a “functionalist general approach to cognition”
(p. 18, ff. 3) that is incompatible with enactivism. For them, this is
shown by the fact that ecological psychology explains perception
in terms of information gathering, use, and transformation.
The same idea has been coined by Hutto and Myin (2017,
p. 86), for whom ecological psychologists’ use of “information
pickup” reveals “an underlying commitment to an information
processing story.”
Once again, I hold that this reading is misguided. Even
though ecological psychologists use “information pickup” and
“information detection” interchangeably, it does not follow that
they hold that perception requires internalizing and processing
information. Instead, an organism is said to pick up information
whenever she tracks the dynamic patterns that are present in the
topology of her sensory array, perceiving what this information
affords. Reed makes this point clear when he claims that
“ecological information cannot be transmitted: it is ambient and
available, not something put over a channel; it is something to
be detected or used (or not) in regulating action. . . . Information
pick up is not a process of “internalizing” information” (Reed,
1996, p. 155). And the same idea is expressed by J. J. Gibson:
I do not believe that the visual system is a channel for transmitting
signals from the retina to the brain. I believe it is a system
for sampling the ambient array. . . . And that means that the
observer’s brain cannot be compared to a computer, or to a
processor of information delivered to it Gibson (1970/1982, p. 86).
Perception, in ecological psychology, does not consist of
coding and passing messages from the sensory organs to the
brain to be further decoded and computed, but on tracking
properties in the sensory array and exploiting them to coordinate
15Based on this idea, Baggs and Chemero (2018) introduce a distinction between
“habitat” and “umwelt.” Whereas “habitat” refers to the environment for a
species, the umwelt refers to the environment for a particular behaving organism.
According to them, this distinction helps fostering our understanding of the active
role of the organism in perception (and cognition).
action in situ. Therefore, we can conclude that the reasons
advanced by Di Paolo et al. (2017) to attack ecological
psychology are misguided.
Yet enactivists are not the only ones to have expressed doubts
upon the possibility of a unified framework. Attacks have come
from the ecological side as well. For example, it is a common
assumption among the Gibsonians that enactivists subscribe to
a kind of mental constructivism that is radically incompatible
with ecological psychology. Fultot et al. (2016) situate this
problem in the way enactivist use the notion of “sense-making.”
For them, because enactivists are “in favor of interpreting
the activity of perceptual agents as a kind of construction of
perceptually meaningful world” (p. 298), enactivism “is germane
to the representationalist, not ecological, theory of cognition”
(p. 304; see De Jesus, 2016; Hutto and Myin, 2017 for similar
claims). Elaborating on the same issue, Heras-Escribano (2018)
asserts that “if enactive agency emphasizes subjectivity, it cannot
be compatible with ecological psychology” (Heras-Escribano,
2018, p. 136).
I nonetheless think that a more charitable reading of
enactivism is possible. Consider, for example, the way Di Paolo
et al. (2018) characterize sense-making:
Sense-making is the capacity of an autonomous system to
adaptively regulate its operation and its relation to the
environment depending on the virtual consequences for its own
viability as a form of life. Being a sense-maker implies an ongoing
(often imperfect and variable) tuning to the world and a readiness
for action (p. 33, emphasis original).
As we can see, Di Paolo et al. steer clear of the constructivist
interpretation of sense-making. On this view, sense-making
does not consist of the creation of subjective meanings by the
individual, but on the discrimination of what in the environment
is relevant for its survival and potential actions. I take this reading
to be totally unproblematic with ecological psychology, and
perfectly compatible with the view of perception as the selective
detection of information about affordances.
Admittedly, more work is needed to build up a general
ecological-enactive approach of the sort Baggs and Chemero
(2018; see also Heras-Escribano, 2019) seek. However, it seems
clear that some of the most well-known reasons for the tension
between ecological psychology and enactivism are based on
misunderstandings. I hope that once these misinterpretations are
clarified, the possibility of building an ecological-enactive theory
of agency looks more plausible.
CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS FOR
FUTURE RESEARCH
Explaining agency is a major challenge for those who
are interested in the sciences of the mind, and non-
representationalists are no exception to this. In this paper, I have
examined how the two most important schools of thought in the
non-representational cognitive sciences, ecological psychology
and enactivism, address the issue of agency. I have proposed
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that there is a mutual fit between enactivism and ecological
psychology, and that both theories can complement each
other to explain sensorimotor agency. According to this view,
the environment, as conceived of by ecological psychologists,
contributes to the emergence of agential behavior by providing
the organism with information about affordances, and agential
behavior depends on the enactment of habitual patterns that
integrate structures at the level of the organism with action-
specific ecological information. Therefore, while enactivists
explain how the history of interactions of an organism gives rise
to a series of sensorimotor schemes and habits (a “sensorimotor
repertoire”) that in turn play a causal role in shaping its current
perception and action, ecological psychology helps us make sense
of the environmental informational patterns that contribute to
the emergence of agential behavior. Remarkably, this proposal
is not in conflict with the idea that some affordances can be
perceived as invitations in certain situations (Withagen et al.,
2012, 2017), but rather contributes to explain how different
individuals, by means of embodying different sensorimotor
repertoires, regularly perceive and exploit certain affordances
instead of others.
Besides, I argue that this ecological-enactive approach can
provide a more comprehensive account of agency than the one
previously provided by ecological psychologists alone. To see
this, consider the problem of explaining how our individual
agency can be modulated by socio-cultural norms. Gibsonians
have largely noted that our relationship with the affordances
of the environment does not only depend on our capability to
detect information. Rather, this relation is often influenced by
the social pressures and norms that rule within the communities
we inhabit. As explained by Heras-Escribano: “Our social norms
and conventions share their space with our individual perception
of affordances, and sometimes our norms exert some pressure
for not taking certain affordances given some social conventions”
(Heras-Escribano, 2018, p. 175).
Gibsonians have nonetheless gone into great pain when trying
to explain how social norms can influence perception-action
in a way that is consistent with the core tenets of ecological
psychology (see, e.g., Costall, 1995, 2012; Heft, 2007, 2017, 2018;
Heras-Escribano, 2018; Rietveld and Kiverstein, 2014). I suggest
that an ecological-enactive approach to sensorimotor agency
can provide us with new theoretical resources to address this
challenge. A hypothesis that is consistent with this approach
is that individuals, by interacting and collaborating with peers,
learn and acquire particular sensorimotor schemes and habits
(see Adolph and Hoch, 2019). If these schemes and habits already
encode (albeit implicitly) the social norms that are distinctive
of their community, then we have a way to understand how
these norms can have an influence on the affordances we
perceive and act upon.
Whether or not the ecological-enactive theory of agency fully
takes off is yet to be seen. If we aim to fully explain human
agency, we must be shown whether an ecological-enactive theory
of agency can explain complex phenomena such as group action
(Marsh et al., 2009) or long-term planning (Brancazio and
Segundo-Ortin, 2020). Nonetheless, it seems that a combined
approach along the lines I have suggested here can be mutually
beneficial and opens up new and promising lines of research.
Let us keep exploring the possibilities of an ecological-enactive
cognitive science.
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